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TRANSFER OF RESIDENCE WITH
CONTINUED OCCUPANCY
— by Neil E. Harl*
The rule has been well established that a transfer of a
residence to a spouse with occupancy by the transferring
spouse until death, would not result in inclusion of the
value of the residence in the transferor's gross estate under a
theory of a retained life estate.1  The courts have
consistently required proof of at least an implied agreement
between the husband and wife (assuming the transferring
spouse continued occupancy) before that spouse is held to
have retained possession or enjoyment so as to require
inclusion of the residence in the gross estate.2  If the
transferor is to prevail, it is generally also necessary to
establish that the residence was not transferred in discharge
of an obligation of support.
The Commissioner's acquiescence in Estate of Gutchess3
indicated that the issue might not be pressed in the
immediate future.4  However, the Internal Revenue Service
litigated and lost again in Diehl v. United States.5  But the
Internal Revenue Service won a round in Estate of
Linderme6 where the residence was quit claimed by the
decedent to the decedent's three sons eight years prior to the
decedent's death.  An understanding apparently existed
between the parties that the decedent could occupy the
house.  The decedent was considered to have retained the
right to possession and enjoyment of the property until his
death since (a) the sons made no attempt to rent or sell the
residence, which remained vacant after the decedent entered a
nursing home 20 months before he died; (b) the proceeds of
sale were used partially to pay obligations of the decedent's
estate; and (c) the decedent resided in the house and paid all
expenses up to the date of his death.7  No gift tax return was
filed.  
IRS prevailed in Estate of Honigman8 by showing an
implied understanding to occupy the residence and prevailed
for similar reasons in Estate of Callahan.9  In Estate of
Bianchi,10 a dairy farm with a residence was conveyed under
a private annuity arrangement to a child but the mother
continued to live in the residence.  The value of the
residence was included in the gross estate.11
*
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But the taxpayers have prevailed in parent-child transfers
during life where there was no express or implied agreement
that the transferor-decedent had the right to live in the
residence.12  By the Commissioner's view, an implied
understanding that the parent can enjoy the residence for life
makes the residence includible in the gross estate.13  It has
generally been thought that, except for husband-wife
arrangements, transfers wherein the donor continued in
exclusive possession or enjoyment were likely to be
challenged.14
The enactment of the 100 percent federal estate tax
marital deduction effective for deaths after 198115
undoubtedly had an effect on the pace of litigation in this
area, at least for transfers involving spouses.
A 1992 Tax Court case, Estate of Maxwell,16 has once
again addressed the question of inclusion in the gross estate
following transfer to a family member during life.  In that
case, the decedent at age 82 and in remission from cancer
transferred her residence to her son and daughter-in-law.  The
decedent forgave part of the amount  with a mortgage
executed for the balance with nine percent interest payable
monthly.  At the time of the conveyance, the decedent
entered into a lease with the son and daughter-in-law to
continue to live in the residence.  The amount of rent was
approximately equal to the interest payments on the
mortgage.  The decedent's will, executed two days after the
transfer, forgave and canceled the mortgage indebtedness at
her death.  In each of the following two years, the decedent
forgave another $20,000 on the note each year.
The Tax Court held that the fair market value of the
property at the decedent's death was includible in her gross
estate because she did not receive adequate and full
consideration in money or money's worth for the property
and she retained the possession and enjoyment of the
residence until her death.  The court said that substance must
prevail over form and the transfer was in reality a transfer
with retention of the right to possession for her life.  The
court cited several factors in support of that conclusion
including the decedent's age and health concerns, the pattern
of forgiveness of mortgage indebtedness during her life and
at her death, the fact that the rent payments approximated
146                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            Agricultural Law Digest
the interest payments on the note and the fact that the son
was the decedent's only heir and the natural object of her
bounty.
A 1991 private letter ruling involved a somewhat similar
issue.17  In that ruling, a revocable inter vivos trust sold an
undivided five percent interest to the children.  The sale was
ineffective and the full fair market value of the residence was
included in the decedent's gross estate.18
Clearly, parent-child transfers will be subjected to close
scrutiny.  To minimize the chance for a successful
challenge, a parent-child transfer should assure control and
enjoyment to the child or children after the transfer.  If the
child does not move into the residence, paying real estate
taxes and maintenance costs is helpful.  A federal gift tax
return should be filed if handled as a gift.  If characterized as
a sale, that characterization should not be weakened by
forgiveness of principal.  In the event the residence is sold
by the new owners, the proceeds should not go to the
decedent's estate.  But even if handled at arm's length, an
IRS challenge may still be successful.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
ESTATE PROPERTY. When the debtor left an
accounting firm, the debtor received monthly payments for
the debtor's share of company stock.  The payments were
contingent upon the debtor's not independently performing
any accounting services for the firm's clients. The debtor
argued that the monthly payments were personal earnings
not included in the bankruptcy estate.  The court held that
the payments were part of the compensation for the debtor's
stock and were estate property. In re  McDaniel, 1 4 1
B.R. 438 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
ANNUITY. The debtor owned several annuities which
were claimed as exempt under Iowa Code § 627.6(8)(e).  The
court held that because the debtor had the right to withdraw
amounts from the annuities at any time, the annuities were
not eligible for the exemption. In re  Huebner, 1 4 1
B.R. 405 (N.D. Iowa 1992).
PERSONAL INJURY AWARDS. The debtor received a
$10,000 settlement from a hospital in satisfaction of a
medical malpractice claim arising out of an injury to the
debtor's arm.  The debtor claimed $5,000 of the settlement
as exempt under Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.66(A)(12), which
did not allow an exemption for amounts received for pain
and suffering or actual pecuniary loss. The settlement did
not identify the portion of the amount which was for
personal injury, pain and suffering or pecuniary loss.  The
trustee objected to the exemption, arguing that the debtor
was required to allocate the settlement as to amounts
received for personal injury and for the other purposes. The
court held that the burden was on the trustee to prove that
the debtor's exemption was not allowed as claimed. In
addition, the court held that the Ohio exemption covered
awards for personal injury and that at least $5,000 of the
settlement was reasonably allocated to the personal injury
and was exempt. In re  Lester, 141 B.R. 157 ( S . D .
Ohio 1992).
The debtor received a $15,000 settlement from the
debtor's insurance company on a suit against the insurance
company for bad faith conduct in failing to pay the debtor's
disability insurance claim arising out of an automobile
accident. The debtor claimed the settlement proceeds as
exempt under Wis. Stat. § 815.18(3)(i)1.c, d, which
provided an exemption for awards for personal injury and
pain and suffering.  The court held that the settlement
